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Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East and South-America (Springer Praxis Books) [Brian Harvey, Henk H. F. Smid, Theo.
Table of contents
- Egypt | Space Generation Advisory Council
- New Zealand space launch is first from a private site
- Why you should care
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- Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East, and South America
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- Company Information.
- UN/Jordan Workshop: Global Partnership in Space Exploration and Innovation.
- Progress in Cryptology - INDOCRYPT 2010: 11th International Conference on Cryptology in India, Hyderabad, India, December 12-15, 2010. Proceedings?
- The new space race in Asia!
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One-upmanship is only a tiny part of the game now, say experts. Technology spin-offs and strategic gains are crucial. And for aspiring regional or global powers, success in space also means a boost to national pride. Not anymore. Some Asian countries — India, China and Japan — have had space programs for decades. India, which in became the first country to place a satellite in Martian orbit on its first attempt, is planning a second trip there for And in January , Japan will launch a Mercury orbiter along with France.
Commerce is a crucial driver of these space programs. Between and July , India launched a total of only 45 foreign satellites. Since then it has launched another China is lapping up contracts from South American and African nations to launch their satellites, says Dublin-based space analyst and author Brian Harvey. Space is also an ideal laboratory for countries keen to ride technology toward modernization, Ben-Israel says. It used its space program to develop electronics and manufacturing capabilities, Harvey says. Though most experts concur that claims by Iran and North Korea over their recent satellite and missile launches are exaggerated, concerns linger, given the simmering tensions in West Asia and the Korean Peninsula.
Iran, Ben-Israel insists, is developing missile-launch capabilities under the garb of its satellite program. Still, there are softer factors at play. Countries are recognizing that success in space can serve as a tool to get their youth interested in science and engineering careers. The UAE space agency, for instance, is holding educational workshops with schools and inking agreements for joint research with universities. Raucous cheers filled the arena. Expect more of that from Asia in the coming months and years. How does a shy lawyer in the midst of a midlife love affair decide to have sex in front of strangers?
Now employees are turning the tables. The tale of Trump, Ukraine and the Biden family is another unfolding election intrigue, but with better documentation. Welcome to a new era in politics around the world, from innovators at the local level to federal disrupters like the Trump administration in America's capital. The North African country is emerging as a key battleground on abortion, with an increasingly assertive movement seeking a break with conservative laws.
Sign Up. Second, Xia and Kondapalli disagree on the potential usefulness of Asia-wide institutions. China doubts that an Asia-wide organization can adequately represent such a geopolitically diverse region, but India sees potential in such initiatives despite their failure to resolve major security issues in the past.
Third, although both Xia and Kondapalli welcome the American presence in the Asian region, they seem to do so on the basis of mutually exclusive assumptions. Beijing also wants the United States to back away from its current militarization of regional issues, such as Taiwan, the Chinese-Japanese disputes, and the maritime squabbles in the South China Sea.
The second pair of essays in this section focuses on the challenges in Southern Asia, defined as the Indian subcontinent in its larger environs, including Afghanistan and China. In fact, they might be more similar than divergent, despite the presence of some important, ineradicable irritants. Li argues that China seeks—in order of decreasing importance—a friendly, stable, and prosperous Southern Asia. The most prominent element of divergence in their strategic objectives, as expressed in these papers, pertains to democracy promotion.
A more significant divergence may be structural in nature. As Li notes, China has been somewhat uninterested in the region as a whole historically, although that situation is now changing. Given the broad similarity in strategic objectives, at least at a formal level, it is not surprising that both Li and Raghavan identify many of the same security threats, ranging from unstable states to terrorism to the volatile Indo-Pakistani relationship. It is interesting that neither author emphasizes the presence and capabilities of the other state as constituting a primary security threat, though the challenges posed by each to the other are never far from the surface.
The Chinese and Indian assessments of geopolitical threats, thus, continue to often be polite but pointed. Li and Raghavan identify a range of issues relating to the smaller Southern Asian states on which both China and India seem to agree. In particular, while both countries eye each other with some suspicion, they do not see themselves as fully locked into a zero-sum game for influence. Competition exists, but core strategic interests are not consistently diametrically opposed and sometimes they even align. Chinese and Indian perceptions of security threats diverge most conspicuously in the nontraditional realm.
The two analyses suggest that while China and India share many mutual security threats, they emphasize different nontraditional security threats. China has focused on drug trafficking and organized crime emanating from the region—particularly from Afghanistan and Myanmar—while India has instead emphasized environmental and natural-resource issues.
How China and India manage their interests in Southern Asia is another important issue for comparison. Both countries see economic cooperation as the principal instrument for achieving their strategic objectives. Additionally, China and India have both supported efforts at diplomatic engagement and encouraged regional cooperation where possible. But there is an important difference as well, which is once again linked to the geographic locations of China and India and the stakes they perceive in Southern Asia.
Significantly, China and India differ in their perspectives on the usefulness of force in the region to achieve their strategic objectives. China appears to have drawn the line at cooperative security measures, espousing a strong policy of noninterference in the domestic affairs of Southern Asian countries. China, it should be noted, has adopted a similar posture in East Asia where it has greater geopolitical stakes, but not in Southern Asia. Finally, Chinese and Indian perspectives seem most sharply divided on their judgments about the role of the United States in Southern Asia.
According to Raghavan, New Delhi does not subscribe to this view. Notably, Li identifies the U. To counteract these policies, Li argues that China has adopted a dual strategy of playing up common interests with the United States while strengthening its regional ties and modernizing its military as a hedge against American threats. The first paired set in the third section of this volume concentrates on the maritime dimension of the global commons.
Of equal significance is their conviction that UNCLOS remains both the core and the framework of that system and that upholding it is therefore incredibly important for continued stability. The strong convergence on this position indicates that China and India, like many other developing countries, see only benefits in supporting a regime that offers strong national control and jurisdiction over ever-increasing ocean areas, especially those subject to the most intense human use. This expanding jurisdiction over broad expanses of ocean waters—a national enclosure of what was previously treated as the high seas—sets both China and India, along with many other Third World states, apart from traditional maritime powers such as the United States.
According to Zhang and Sakhuja, China and India both see UNCLOS as codifying, not rejecting, the inheritance of customary international law while also expanding upon it in various significant and welcome ways. UNCLOS also added new rules about the passage of vessels, including the activities of naval and research ships, in waters where China and India now enjoy jurisdiction. Of course, China also appreciates the stability provided by UNCLOS, but the differences in emphasis between the two authors are potentially telling.
For that reason, both China and India believe that any changes to the global maritime order should occur through revisions and additions to the UNCLOS regime. In this context, Zhang and Sakhuja argue that China and India have developed similar approaches to managing their maritime disputes, both strongly supporting the process of diplomatic negotiation as the primary tool for dispute resolution.
However, Beijing and New Delhi also caution that maritime disputes are not simply the result of differing interpretations of UNCLOS and that they often incorporate complicated historical, political, economic, and social factors that make them difficult to settle. Moreover, Zhang argues that UNCLOS cannot be used as a legal foundation to make new claims over territorial sovereignty since it only applies to maritime boundaries. While both authors argue that their countries support diplomatic negotiations as the primary tool for resolving maritime disputes, there appears to be some distance between them on the issue of alternatives to diplomacy.
But as it does so, it retains the right to employ force if necessary to resolve the elements of contested sovereignty that may be inherent in the quarrel. In contrast, Sakhuja argues that India enthusiastically embraces international arbitration under UNCLOS if no resolution through diplomatic negotiation is possible.
The disagreements between China and India extend to their perceptions of the role of the United States in the global maritime order as well. China and India also look askance at American maritime initiatives that might interfere with their sovereignty or the freedom of the seas.
While China routinely confronts U. Thus, although the two powers reject the American legal justification for its military operations, their practical responses to these activities are vastly different. This difference can be explained only by the fact that for all their ideational solidarity over UNCLOS, China and India view the role of the United States in the global maritime order through very different lenses.
Specifically, China sees the U. Navy, has a robust program of joint exercises, and is exploring more expansive forms of military-to-military cooperation with U. India believes that the U. Navy is providing an important global public good by maintaining maritime order and stability.
Both Shen and Gopalaswamy agree that China and India view space as a critical arena for advancing their economic and national security goals. Consequently, both states are accelerating their space programs, which are in many ways exemplars of national achievement, and both are increasingly devoting resources as well as political and bureaucratic attention to the issue of space security. This broad similarity notwithstanding, there are conspicuous differences in the two national programs.
The Indian space program has been from its inception an entirely civilian endeavor, and it has only recently been pressed by its national security managers into supporting some military tasks. This reorientation, however, is still extremely modest, and the strategic components of the Indian space program pale in comparison to its emphasis on development. China does not have a clearly defined civilian space component. Instead, it has seamlessly integrated the civilian and military dimensions of space into one program.
Thus, although Beijing pursues a wide set of objectives that include exploring space and making discoveries for the benefit of humanity as a whole, these activities are natural progressions of various organizational endeavors that have, at their base, a strong military complexion. As Shen and Gopalaswamy note, these broad differences in orientation are reflected in the fundamentally divergent approaches that China and India have pursued toward their strategic objectives in space.
Additionally, Beijing has tested many weapons systems that have explicitly counterspace functions—the antisatellite test being the most conspicuous example—which again indicates a predominantly military space program. Moreover, New Delhi has taken a measured and exploratory approach to space-technology development, focusing on a few specific areas rather than advancing its technological capabilities at every level.
Both programs are government-directed, but the Indian government lacks the resources available to its Chinese counterpart. Thus, unlike China, which has invested in its military space programs across the board, India has specifically prioritized improving mainly its space imagery and surveillance, position and navigation, and communication systems.
All this suggests that although both China and India remain opposed to the militarization of space and have strongly advocated the use of space for exclusively peaceful ends, neither country is optimistic about preventing such a development and both are engaged in exactly those activities normally associated with militarization. Shen and Gopalaswamy acknowledge that evolving strategic circumstances may compel their countries to protect their interests by increasingly relying on military instruments, but both disavow any interest in starting an arms race in space.
But while China and India contend that any militarization will be in response to threats posed by others, they disagree sharply on the sources of those threats. Shen argues that the greatest threat to China emerges from U. He notes that the Chinese test caught India off guard and precipitated a debate on space security as New Delhi took notice of its dependence on increasingly vulnerable assets in space.
Shen and Gopalaswamy both contend that their countries have stressed the development of an international space regime that incorporates the use of multilateral forums as part of their efforts to deal with the dangers associated with the ongoing militarization of space. Ultimately, though, Beijing and New Delhi believe that only unilateral actions can adequately protect their security.
Finally, there are revealing differences in Chinese and Indian attitudes toward U. Beijing and New Delhi hope to cooperate with Washington to maximize mutual commercial and technological gains while simultaneously tamping down security competition.
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But both Asian countries are skeptical about the extent of possible cooperation. Their reasons for this skepticism, however, vary greatly. The final pair of essays in the section on security challenges in the global commons focuses on cybersecurity, perhaps the most pernicious problem of the contemporary age given the ubiquity of computer connectivity, the high level of network integration that ties together all the key sectors of the modern economy, and the inherent difficulties in detecting, attributing, and neutralizing cyberattacks. Unfortunately, the increasing importance of cyberspace has been accompanied by an increasing number of threats against it in both countries.
Tang lists four types of cyberthreats, all of which Bhattacharjee echoes—hacking, illegal online activities, cyberterrorism, and the militarization of cyberspace. In addition, both China and India confront actions in cyberspace that threaten their political stability, thus leading both to expansively treat such activities as cyberattacks. In this environment, China and India have increasingly prioritized cybersecurity, albeit in fits and starts.
Both countries have worked hard to first establish and then to fine-tune a legal regime that adequately addresses cybercrimes. Both have also struggled to manage a multi-actor governmental system in which different agencies have different cybersecurity responsibilities and powers—a system not entirely different from that of United States—and have actively cooperated in bilateral and multilateral cybersecurity efforts with other countries.
Egypt | Space Generation Advisory Council
Finally, both China and India have recognized the importance of public-private partnerships in overcoming national cybersecurity challenges, a critical step forward for countries with large economies and many major private enterprises. China has approached the issue of cybersecurity by linking government, industry, nongovernmental organizations, and individuals. It has encouraged industry to work toward national technological autonomy to prevent China from depending on the technology of foreign powers and thus being open to sabotage.
In China, industry works closely with regulators and often self-regulates, but in India, private actors generally work at the behest of the government rather than independently. Bhattacharjee does not mention any efforts toward technological autonomy. Perhaps the only exceptions are current Indian efforts in the telecommunications sector. New Delhi, fearful of Trojan horse technologies that could be deployed by Chinese telecommunications giants like Huawei, has developed a national strategy that requires key hardware items to be manufactured locally and incorporated exclusively into telecommunications infrastructure, particularly in components such as routers, switches, and exchanges.
Although such unilateral efforts to protect cyberspace are certain to become more common in both countries, Tang and Bhattacharjee agree that China and India recognize both the difficulty and the necessity of broader international cooperation in this area. These divergences are compounded by differing legal systems, law enforcement capabilities, and stages of development. Nevertheless, China and India both recognize that the transnational nature of cyberspace means that states should have common objectives.
According to Tang and Bhattacharjee, this recognition should lead to the creation of a robust cybersecurity regime. This new regime should be informed by the UN Charter and the laws of armed conflict, and it should respect state sovereignty and the necessity of resolving international disputes through peaceful means. States should complement these official efforts through multilateral cooperation and initiatives to create mutual trust in cyberspace. While these objectives are indeed laudable, it is not clear from these analyses how China and India would expect a legal regime to deter the illegitimate actions of private actors or private actors clandestinely supported by states when attribution is difficult and time-consuming.
A legal regime may create definitions of unacceptable behavior, but whether it could effectively deter or penalize misuses of cyberspace is highly questionable in the absence of a strong supranational authority, which China and India are unlikely to support. Tang declares that China values an open Internet but recognizes that complete freedom is impossible whether online or offline.
Bhattacharjee agrees, saying that while India is constitutionally committed to the freedom of speech and expression, that freedom is not unlimited and must be balanced against other concerns, including national security. Tang further argues that freedom should not be absolute and that the government should be able to fulfill its obligations as a regulator as long as Internet policy is lawful and in the interest of most Chinese citizens.
Bhattacharjee echoes this attitude and avers that online content can be regulated through all means by which freedom of speech and expression would be regulated in the offline world. Finally, Tang and Bhattacharjee agree that cyberwarfare and espionage conducted in cyberspace are likely to be used by states in the future and that such a development—while of concern—is not illegal under international law.
China and India disavow the use of surrogates in cyberspace or nationalist hackers as means of cyberwarfare, noting that they contravene the international conventions on war. However, both authors imply that China and India will soon develop offensive capabilities in this area if they are not doing so already precisely because many elements that would otherwise help deter such development—including the clarity and speed of attribution as well as the certitude of a devastating response—remain unclear.
The two essays also suggest that China and India differ somewhat when it comes to taking responsibility for attacks that emanate from within their borders. The first pair of papers in this section focuses on energy security, a subject of importance for any economy and especially for those growing at a particularly rapid rate. The two essays addressing these issues are authored by Zha Daojiong and Sunjoy Joshi on China and India, respectively. Both China and India rely heavily on coal, and this reliance—despite its deleterious environmental impact—is unlikely to decrease substantially in either country.
They are also optimistic about making use of their domestic shale-gas reserves in light of recent technological advances, but they remain unsure about whether they have the ability—for technological, political, and regulatory reasons—to access these reserves in the near future. Zha observes that China is largely self-sufficient in all energy sources save oil and that its dependence on foreign sources of energy will largely be limited to this sphere. In contrast, Joshi notes that India already depends heavily on foreign sources of oil, coal, and natural gas and that this dependence is likely to intensify in the future.
Obviously, issues of access, source, and price are all intimately connected.
At a broad level, though, China and India are united in their desire to reliably access energy at affordable prices. In their effort to achieve this goal domestically, both China and India have adopted hybrid, market-state domestic energy systems where market prices are paired with government price controls, regulation, and subsidies.
These similar systems, however, have different focuses. China focuses fundamentally on reducing its energy intensity to allow for both continuing economic growth and decreasing energy consumption, and it emphasizes the rapid domestic development of its energy assets.
In both countries the efforts to expand internal energy sources have run up against rising domestic concerns about safety—especially in a democratic polity such as India. Both countries emphasize nuclear energy as an important component of energy security, but their central governments have become increasingly wary about approving new projects. Meanwhile India has allowed its compromised nuclear-liability legislation, the culture of secrecy pervading its atomic-energy establishment, and its leisurely decisionmaking to ensure that its dreams of large-scale investments in nuclear energy will take even longer to come to fruition than its leaders originally imagined.
It remains to be seen whether alternatives to nuclear power can assuage public concerns about safety while simultaneously providing the massive increases in baseload power that are needed. The quest for energy security inevitably takes both China and India toward international sources and markets. Zha and Joshi affirm that Beijing and New Delhi have internationalized their energy security by actively pursuing foreign sources of energy through their national energy companies.
Both countries have balanced a mix of market-based and statist behavior to address their general apprehensions about reliance on foreign markets. On the one hand, the two states continue to maintain a high degree of control and influence over their NECs through various political and bureaucratic instruments.
On the other hand, the NECs are also subject to the concerns and imperatives of other nonstate investors. Partially because of this, Zha and Joshi agree that Chinese and Indian NECs are typically driven by commercial concerns much more than they are by national security interests. But there is an important difference in how the NECs are situated in each country relative to their parent government.
The two countries also differ when it comes to state political support for NEC deals. The Chinese and Indian presence in foreign energy markets will remain a fact of life for the foreseeable future.
New Zealand space launch is first from a private site
To the extent that China and India have invested in foreign energy assets, however, they have often done so primarily in states that enjoy little foreign investment either due to their political pariah status or a risky investment climate. China and India have also been more reticent than Western powers to get involved in local governance issues. In response to this situation, China has tried to initiate multilateral discussions with all major energy-relevant countries. On the final issue of the utility of military instruments for energy security, the elements of convergence and divergence between China and India reflect their larger approach to how global-order issues intersect with their geopolitical interests.
To combat these perceived insecurities, Zha and Joshi agree that Beijing and New Delhi have committed themselves to international collective-security efforts aimed at redressing specific security threats such as piracy. Zha and Joshi advance different reasons for why their respective nations will not use their own military capabilities unilaterally to protect their overseas energy assets. It should not be surprising that while China and India share concerns about the security of their sea lines of communication, they have divergent views of the role of the United States, and particularly the U.
Navy, in protecting them. Zha underscores the fact that Chinese analysts are anxious about the leverage of the U.
Navy and fear that it might blockade China in the event of a conflict. India, on the other hand, is apprehensive about the withdrawal and retrenchment of American naval capabilities, especially as U. Authored by Zhang Shiqiu and Ligia Noronha, these essays address Chinese and Indian perceptions of national and global environmental challenges, their strategies for dealing with these challenges, the role of international agreements in this context, and how both states seek to balance economic growth with environmental responsibility.
Zhang and Noronha agree that both China and India have encountered severe domestic environmental stress as a result of their national concentration on rapid economic growth. Health and environmental problems are pervasive in China and India, caused by the intense use of resources in production coupled with rising consumption.
Among many challenges, both countries see pollution and the deterioration of domestic environmental quality as the greatest immediate threats. Noronha also cites threats to natural resources and global environmental problems as other major challenges in India. And despite some successes in improving the quality of the environment, China and India believe that persistently scare resources, high economic growth, and rapid social development will aggravate these challenges.
Both China and India have sought to address these challenges through a wide variety of legislation and regulation aimed at ameliorating environmental degradation. In general, it seems that both countries have adopted primarily command-and-control measures, but there has also been a limited movement toward market-based regulation supplemented by a focus on raising public awareness. Despite these broad resemblances, however, China and India appear to have invested dissimilar amounts of resources in environmental management.
China has spent significant sums in an effort to clean up the environment. While Zhang judges that current programs are still insufficient, they nonetheless represent a genuine effort to resolve the problem. China consciously seeks to improve its efficiency, restructure its economy, and change its long-term growth path in order to guarantee its sustainability. To the extent that the government has attempted to address the problem often as a byproduct of other efforts such as energy security , its writ is frequently ignored at the level of enforcement, meaning that India has a long way to go before it successfully mitigates its environmental threats.
Zhang and Noronha acknowledge that both China and India have tried to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental health by concentrating on areas where the two issues do not conflict. Despite their best intentions, therefore, both China and India at some level appear to have prioritized economic growth over environmental health. The Chinese and Indian struggles to manage environmental issues within their countries occur within the context of larger global environmental challenges. Zhang and Noronha identify widespread public awareness in both countries of these transnational environmental problems, especially climate change.
According to Zhang and Noronha, both China and India believe the best way to deal with the critical challenges facing the global environment is through international negotiations among all states and through the existing institutions of global governance. This will require some series of international agreements, but their character, enforceability, and division of burdens remain issues of great contention.
Additionally, neither China nor India has staked out a clear position on whether international environmental agreements should generally entail a high degree of formal obligation, presumably because any position on this question would depend on how the responsibilities were apportioned between developed and developing countries. India, for instance, would balance the loss of sovereignty against the fairness of an agreement in making a decision to sign it.
The discussion in these two papers suggests that China and India diverge over the degree of external authority that is acceptable in international environmental agreements. In contrast, Noronha notes that India finds the notion of delegating external authority troubling. Given the difficulties in reaching an acceptable international consensus on these issues, Zhang and Noronha indicate that China and India do not expect concerted global action to appear for some time and are therefore likely to stay focused on pursuing independent national solutions.
This conclusion is reinforced by the position of both countries on any future international climate change agreement. Similarly, both China and India refuse to take on any onerous responsibility before the developed world acts. Zhang and Noronha concede that China and India will need to undertake serious efforts to curb their emissions but argue that they will do so only after the developed world has committed itself to stringent caps on emissions and in a way that does not hinder development in emerging countries.
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Both countries also stress the importance of measuring per capita emissions as opposed to national ones, which is unsurprising given their continental sizes. Given the mutual focus on CBDR and the needs of developing countries, China and India both strongly support the continuation of the Kyoto process begun with the Kyoto Protocol and the use of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change for a future global climate agreement.
As Chinese and Indian positions are generally in accord on the issue of managing the environment, it is unsurprising that the two countries have diverged only slightly in their perspectives on past climate change conferences. The differences between the two Asian giants on bilateral matters are well known, but a careful study of their positions on these major issues leads inevitably to the conclusion that the divide between Beijing and New Delhi may be just as significant on matters of global magnitude.
In fact, this study suggests that outside of the international economic system, energy security, and environmental issues, Sino-Indian differences on all other examined subjects—the global order, the nonproliferation system, Asian security, regional stability in southern Asia, and security in the maritime commons, space, and cyberspace—are considerable even though those differences may not always be apparent in public discussions.
To be sure, both sides bend over backward to conceal their differences in public, and both have often struggled to reach some accommodation that might permit occasional practical cooperation.
And that contest takes on critical significance as both Beijing and New Delhi seek to manipulate their bilateral relationship and ties to Washington and other international capitals for national gain. This reality leads to three important reminders. First, despite the superficial convergence between China and India on many global issues, there are deeper disagreements that—though sometimes subtle especially when compared to the differences in Chinese and Indian views on the United States —are nevertheless likely to preclude the development of a meaningful partnership between Beijing and New Delhi.
Second, the disagreements among China, India, and the United States on many global issues are often rooted in, and reinforced by, structural constraints that are significant enough not only to prevent a meaningful resolution of many transnational problems but also to generate potentially pernicious consequences for both the global order and individual states. A possible exception to this generalization might be the international economy, where the interests of all three powers may align on many of the major issues. Third, in contrast to the global issues discussed in this volume—where there is apparent convergence between China and India even if the same is not reflected in the details—the bilateral problems that plague the Sino-Indian relationship are so serious that even their outwardly optimistic and polite rhetoric cannot mask their underlying suspicions and corrosive rivalry.
This security dilemma, in turn, frustrates whatever possibilities may otherwise have opened up for bilateral cooperation on global issues. The problems inherent in this complicated interaction suggest that a better understanding of the Sino-Indian rivalry remains the critical research task for the future. Download the rest of the chapters in the full report. Follow the conversation— Sign up to receive email updates when comments are posted to this article.
Indians aren't 'obsessed' with china The concern comes from the fact that here you have a neighbour you can't trust, and had a history of imperialistic ambitions, which they continue to exhibit. No one is obsessed with china, no one in India even cares Indians are not obsessedd with any nation. I'm not sure wqhat league you are in - definetly not in the league of nations! Bone up on history. The World Unpacked is a weekly foreign policy podcast, hosted by Jen Psaki, that breaks down the hottest global issues of today with experts, journalists, and policymakers who can explain what is happening, why it matters, and where we go from here.
You are leaving the website for the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy and entering a website for another of Carnegie's global centers. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Sign up for Carnegie Email. Experts Publications Events. Experts Publications. Experten Publikationen. Latest Analysis Publications Popular Projects. Programs Projects. Regions and Countries Issues. Preview this publication. Ashley J. Published January 10, Sino-Indian differences are considerable on issues relating to the nonproliferation system, Asian security, regional stability in Southern Asia, and security in the maritime commons, space, and cyberspace.
Emerging Space Powers: The New Space Programs of Asia, the Middle East, and South America
The two rising powers broadly agree on matters relating to the international economic system, energy security, and the environment. Because of its ongoing shift to the Asia-Pacific and status as the only global superpower, the United States must manage a complex set of relationships with China and India, which are at times working at cross-purposes. Chinese and Indian Positions on International Issues Global Order: China and India tend to agree on the importance of state sovereignty and the need to reform global governance institutions to reflect the new balance of power.
Introduction The concurrent rise of China and India represents a geopolitical event of historic proportions. Considerations for U. Policy How can the United States integrate China, India, and other emerging powers into various international institutions without diluting their efficiency, threatening U.
How can the United States lead the reform of the UNSC and other international bodies concerned with global rulemaking if there continue to be significant gaps in preferences even between democratic partners such as the United States and India? While China stresses reforming state-owned enterprises, India believes the problem is structural and thus advises reforming the system itself.
How can Washington pursue the enlargement of the global trading order in the face of new entrants, such as state-owned enterprises, that could be little more than state proxies in a field otherwise populated by private-market players? How can the United States protect the status of the U. How can Washington sustain its commitment to expanding the world trading system if the proliferation of bilateral and regional FTAs continually accentuates trade diversion? How can the United States continue to sustain the open trading order if its net consequence is breeding new global rivals to American primacy?
Policy How can the United States strengthen the NPT system through possible incorporation of outliers in the face of the significant differences that exist on this score between Washington and Beijing? How can the United States secure Chinese and Indian cooperation in addressing the nuclear challenges posed by North Korea and Iran when Beijing and New Delhi have different priorities relative to Washington on these issues?